Uniform Limitations Period for Civil RICO by De Armond, Elizabeth D.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 3 Article 7
1-1-1986
Uniform Limitations Period for Civil RICO
Elizabeth D. De Armond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth D. De Armond, Uniform Limitations Period for Civil RICO, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 495 (1986).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol61/iss3/7
A Uniform Limitations Period for Civil RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act'
(RICO) does not contain an express statute of limitations for civil
actions.2 Consequently, the courts have applied the limitations pe-
riod for the state statute most analogous to the civil RICO action.3
RICO's unique structure, however,4 combined with its breadth
1 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1982).
2 The criminal provision of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) also does not provide an
express statute of limitations. United States v. Bethea, 672 F.2d 407, 419 (5th Cir. 1982),
however, applied the general five year statute for non-capital offenses to criminal RICO
prosecutions.
3 When a cause of action arises under a federal statute not containing an express limi-
tations provision, the general rule is for courts to apply the limitations period for the most
analogous state statute. Johnson v. Railway Express, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). This is
illustrated in the following civil RICO cases: Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l
Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 248 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985); Compton v. Ide, 732
F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 807 (D. Md. 1985);
Electronics Relays (India) Pvt., Ltd. v. Pascente, 610 F. Supp. 648, 649 (N.D. Ill. 1985);
Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 689, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Creamer
v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Del. 1984); Victoria
Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429,431' (D. Colo. 1984); Teltronics Services, Inc.
v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Burns v. Ersek, 591 F.
Supp. 837, 843 (D. Conn. 1984); Stevens Home Operating, Inc. v. Home State Savings, 105
F.R.D. 7, 10 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Seawell v. Miller Brewing Corp., 576 F. Supp. 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 1983); D'Iorio v.
Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 231 (M.D. Pa. 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of
Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 683-84 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
4 RICO presents a special problem for determining limitations periods. RICO is a
crime of association, which is violated by "any person... associated with any enterprise...
the activities of which affect . . . commerce, conduct[ing] . . . [the] enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering." 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). RICO provides a civil rem-
edy of treble damages for "[any person injured in his business by reasons of a violation of
section 1962." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). The statute defines racketeering activity to in-
clude a variety of predicate offenses. The statute provides that:
"[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dan-
gerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the
following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to brib-
ery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating
to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act
indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement
from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit
transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information),
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section
1503 (relating to obstruction ofjustice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of
criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local
law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery,
or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to in-
terstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to un-
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and remedial policies, 5 make finding an analogous state statute of
limitations difficult. A RICO claim consists of an association of
predicate acts, most of which are also state offenses. One RICO
claim, however, can consist of many different types of predicate of-
fenses, including securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud, each
of which could have a different limitations period when analogized
to state law. Furthermore, the predicate offenses comprising the
RICO claim may occur in two or more different states, or may in-
volve multistate corporations, making it difficult to choose which
state law should govern the limitations period for the RICO of-
fense.6 This has resulted in a lack of uniformity in limitations peri-
lawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transporta-
tion of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband
cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is
indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions
on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to em-
bezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a
case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in nar-
cotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
A pattern of racketeering activity is, at a minimum, "two acts of racketeering activity
committed within ten years of each other." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). Thus, for liability
under RICO, a defendant must have committed at least two predicate acts in a pattern.
Pattern means "continu[ous] and relat[ed]," not "isolated" or "sporadic." S. REP. No. 617,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969). See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 105 S. Ct.
3275, 3295 n.14 (1985).
5 Congress created RICO to provide a broad federal weapon against organized crime,
and provided a civil remedy of treble damages to encourage private litigants to eradicate
organized crime and its infiltration into legitimate businesses. See The Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) (Statement of Findings and
Purpose); Blakey, The Civil RICO Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 58 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 237, 280 (1982); Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3275, 3287 (1985) ("RICO is to be
read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self consciously expansive language
and overall approach ... but also of its express admonition that 'RICO is to be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purpose.' Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970). The statute's 'remedial purposes' are nowhere more evi-
dent than in the provision of a private action for those injured by racketeering injury.").
The legislative history makes clear that Congress designed RICO to reach a wide vari-
ety of offenses, and civil RICO has become a very powerful tool against business crime,
especially since the Supreme Court decided Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275
(1985) (holding that RICO does not require that a private action can only proceed against a
defendant who has already been convicted of a predicate act or of a RICO violation, nor
does it require the plaintiff to suffer a "racketeering injury" to bring a private RICO action).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1982) provides: "[a]ny civil action or proceeding under this
chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for
any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs."
Once the court determines the place of accrual, borrowing statutes will bar an action in the
forum state if it would be barred in the jurisdiction of accrual. Special Project, Time Ban in
Specialized Common Law Federal Rights of Action, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1095 (1980). The
court, however, must determine where a multistate RICO action "accrued." Courts in
jurisdictions without borrowing statutes will decide whether the forum state's interests and
contacts with the cause of action are stronger than those of the state of accrual.
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ods among jurisdictions and among decisions within the same
jurisdiction. 7
This note examines whether the methods used by courts in es-
tablishing limitations periods for RICO satisfy the functions of
RICO and the purposes underlying statutes of limitation. Part I de-
scribes the general rule of adoption of state law. Part II criticizes
the two approaches used by courts in determining a limitations pe-
riod for civil RICO actions. Part III concludes that an express limi-
tations period for civil RICO would best serve the functions of
RICO and the policy concerns underlying limitations periods in
general. Until Congress enacts such a provision, however, courts,
to achieve uniformity, should apply the limitations period of the
most analogous federal statute-the four year limitations period of
the federal antitrust laws.
I. Judicial Approaches in Determining Statute of Limitations
When a federal statute does not contain an express limitations
period, the general rule is that a court should adopt the limitations
period for the most analogous state statute, as long as it is not in-
consistent with the policy of the federal statute.8 This practice per-
mits state legislatures to determine the appropriate limitations
period for federal statutes, thus allowing them to incorporate their
substantive policies by filling in the gaps left by these statutes.9
The problem with RICO is deciding on what factors to analogize.
In determining the appropriate statute of limitations for a RICO
7 Compare Durante Bros. & Sons, 755 F.2d at 249 (uniform period of three years applies
to civil RICO claims), and Teltronics Services, 587 F. Supp. at 733 (E.D.N.Y 1984) (uniform
period of three years applies to civil RICO claims) with Fustok v. Conticommodity Services,
Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (six year period for fraud applied; rejected a
uniform period), and Estee Lauder, 621 F. Supp. 689 (six year period for fraud applied;
rejected a uniform period).
8 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). See note 3 supra and
accompanying text.
9 Special Project, supra note 6, at 1043-44. When Congress omits a statute of limita-
tions, it is not presumed that they intended that no time bar should exist for the statute.
We can infer that Congress knows the law, and thus knows that courts will look for an
analogous state statute if such statute would not be inconsistent with the intent and policies
of the federal statute. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); Del
Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-59 & n.12 (1983).
In Occidental Life, the EEOC sued Occidental alleging that Occidental used sexually
discriminatory employment practices which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 432 U.S. at 357-58. Congress intended that employment discrimination claims be
settled administratively, if possible, and the Act requires that the EEOC exhaust administra-
tive remedies before resorting to court action. Id. at 368. The analogous state statute had a
limitations period of one year, and the court decided that a one year time limit would frus-
trate Congress' intent by not allowing the EEOC sufficient time to try to settle the claims
administratively. Id. at 371-72.
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claim, courts have analogized to a variety of factors, including facts,
remedy, and policy.
Generally, courts use two approaches to characterize a civil
RICO claim. One approach characterizes a civil RICO claim in
terms of its underlying predicate acts (the "particularistic ap-
proach"). The other characterizes a civil RICO claim as a claim in
itself, separate from its underlying predicate acts (the "separate act
approach").
A. The Particularistic Approach: Underlying Predicate Acts
The particularistic approach adopts the limitations period that
would apply to the state law action most analogous to the predomi-
nant predicate offense. For example, in Fustok v. Conticommodity
Services, Inc., t° the plaintiff brought a civil RICO claim against a
group of investors, alleging predicate acts of mail fraud and wire
fraud.' 1 The defendants argued for the three year limitations pe-
riod which applied to state law actions to recover for a liability, pen-
alty, or forfeiture.' 2 The plaintiff argued that because the alleged
predicate acts were mail fraud and wire fraud, the appropriate limi-
tations period was the six year period for common law fraud.13 The
District Court for the Southern District of New York admitted that
decisions determining the statute of limitations for civil RICO ac-
tions were inconsistent within the Second Circuit.1 4 Nevertheless,
the general trend favored a case-by-case, particularistic approach,
at least where the character of the underlying offense was fraud.' 5
The court decided that the appropriate limitations period was to be
derived from the state cause of action which most closely resembled
10 618 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
11 In Fustok, the plaintiff brought actions under both the Commodity Exchange Act and
RICO. The bases of the Commodity Exchange Act and RICO allegations were that the
defendants reallocated 200 losing silver futures contracts originally bought for someone
else to plaintiff's trading account, and further failed to supervise the handling of the ac-
count. Id. at 1077.
12 Id. at 1077.
13 Id. at 1080.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1080. A Second Circuit case, Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l
Bank, 755 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985), held that the appropriate
statute of limitations for the civil RICO claim was the three year period provided by N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. LAW § 214 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1986), the period for which the defendants
argued. However, two previous district court cases within the circuit had arrived at conflict-
ing conclusions. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), rejected the idea of a uniform period for all RICO actions and adopted the six year
period for fraud as most suited to the facts of the case. In contrast, Teltronics Services, Inc.
v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), rejected the idea of variable
limitations periods and adopted the three year period given by N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 214
(2) (McKinney Supp. 1986) to be the uniform period for civil RICO actions.
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the basis of the RICO complaint, the underlying predicate act.' 6
The court therefore applied the six year limitations period for state
fraud actions.' 7 In doing so, the court rejected a Second Circuit
case, Durante Bros. & Sons v. Flushing National Bank,'I which held that
the three year period governing actions to enforce a liability cre-
ated by statute should be the uniform period for civil RICO
actions.19
Another case, Stevens Operating, Inc. v. Home State Savings,20 used
the Fustok approach by analogizing the underlying predicate of-
fenses to a state cause of action. In Stevens Operating, fraud was the
underlying predicate offense. 2' The court carefully considered
which state statute of limitations was most similar to the RICO
claim by looking at three possible choices: a six year period for
liability created by statute, a four year period for fraud, and a one
year period for statutes imposing a penalty or forfeiture. 22
The court quickly dismissed the third choice, stating that RICO
was not a punitive statute, despite the availability of treble dam-
ages. 23 The court also rejected the first choice because "RICO cre-
16 618 F. Supp. at 1081.
17 Id. The court stated that "the complaint.., alleges fraud in vivid detail." Id.
18 755 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985). In Durante, the Second
Circuit reversed a lower court's opinion which applied a one year statute of limitations for
causes of action to recover overcharges of interest to a RICO claim whose underlying of-
fense was the collection of an unlawful debt. The Second Circuit found that "[t]here [is] no
state analog to the present civil RICO claim" and adopted a catch-all statute, the three year
statute of limitations governing state actions to enforce a liability created by statute. Id. at
249.
19 Id. The defendants in Fustok contended that the Durante court's holding, which se-
lected the three year statute, was meant to apply to all civil RICO claims in the Second
Circuit, regardless of the underlying predicate offense. The plaintiff, however, argued that
Durante applied where the underlying predicate offense of a civil RICO claim is the collec-
tion of an unlawful debt. The Fustok court agreed with the plaintiff and thus relied on its
own reasoning. 618 F. Supp. at 1080-81.
20 105 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Ohio 1984). In an action alleging breach of contract and fraud,
the defendants sought to file an amended cross claim adding a fraud count under civil
RICO.
21 Id. at 11.
22 Id.
23 Id. Accord State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 685 (N.D.
Ind. 1982) (nature of civil RICO action held remedial, not punitive; limitations period for
statutory penalties inappropriate); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 232 (M.D. Pa.
1982) (despite treble damages provision, civil RICO action is not an action for civil penalty
or forfeiture; therefore limitations period for civil penalties is inappropriate). But see Elec-
tronics Relays (India) Pvt., Ltd. v. Pascente, 610 F. Supp. 648, 651-52 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (civil
RICO action is best characterized as a treble damages action; the limitations period for
personal injury-penalty applies); Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587
F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (civil RICO action characterized as an action to recover
upon a liability, penalty, or forfeiture created by statute).
The Sixth Circuit previously held that civil antitrust actions were not penal in nature,
despite the availability of treble damages. Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 293
F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1961). The Stevens court decided that since the treble damages provision
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ates a new remedy, not a new liability." 24 The court adopted the
second choice, the four year limitations period for fraud, because
fraud was the substantive nature of the underlying predicate of-
fense.25 The court found that the alleged predicate offense was
"nothing more than common law fraud allegations clothed in the
season's new fashion: RICO." 26
Characterizing a RICO claim in terms of its underlying predi-
cate acts has the following advantages: (1) the state may define a
limitations period which it feels best serves the judicial system;
(2) the underlying offenses are easier to conceptionalize as the
crime, rather than an abstract association of offenses; 27 and (3) be-
cause almost all the predicate offenses listed 28 are state offenses,
they are likely to have state statutory limitations periods. 29 In con-
trast, only twenty-three states have similar racketeering acts compa-
rable to RICO.30 Therefore, choosing the limitations period for the
in the antitrust laws was not considered penal, neither was the treble damages provision in
RICO. 105 F.R.D. at 11.
24 Id. Some other courts disagree, perceiving RICO as creating a new liability. See Du-
rante Bros., 755 F.2d at 249 (adopting period governing actions to enforce liability created
by statute); Teltronics Services, 587 F. Supp. at 733 (adopting period governing actions to
recover upon a liability, penalty, or forfeiture created by statute); Seawell v. Miller Brewing
Co., 576 F. Supp. 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (adopting period governing liabilities created
by statute, either state or federal).
25 105 F.R.D. at 11.
26 Id. Other courts evaluating the limitations problem disagree. These courts perceive
RICO as more than just a new remedy for old offenses. See, e.g., Durante Bros., 755 F.2d at
248 (RICO is concerned with much more than the underlying predicate acts; a state law
claim can be established without proving most of the elements required to prove a civil
RICO claim); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 808 (D. Md. 1985) (RICO does not pro-
vide a remedy for the mere commission of predicate acts and there is no commonality of
purpose between RICO and the statutory scheme encompassing the predicate acts); Tellron-
ics Services, 587 F. Supp. at 733 (to analogize on the basis of the predicate act would over-
simplify the elements of a RICO claim).
27 See note 4 supra.
28 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See note 4 supra.
29 Those predicate offenses that are federal offenses are similar to available state causes
of action. For example, wire fraud and mail fraud are analogous to the state cause of action
for common law fraud.
30 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to -2316 (1978 & Supp. 1984-85); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 186-186.8 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to -109 (Supp.
1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-393 to -403 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 895.01 to .05 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3401 to -3414 (1983); HAwAII
REV. STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7801 to -7805 (Supp. 1984); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 56-112, §§ 1651-1660 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (limited to narcotics);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1-2, 34-4-30.5-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:1351 to :1356 (West 1985) (limited to narcotics); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-1 to -I 1
(Lawyers Co-op 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 207.350 to .520 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41
6.2 (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1-6 (Michie Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-01 to -08 (Smith 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.04 (Page 1982);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.715 to .735 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon 1983):
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 7-15-1 to -II (Michie Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to -
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state action most analogous to the predicate offense appears to be
an easy solution.
Problems, however, exist with this approach. A claimant may
allege two or more types of predicate offenses to form the "pat-
tern" of the RICO offense. Each predicate offense may have a dif-
ferent limitations period when analogized to the nearest state cause
of action. When this occurs, it is not clear which limitations period
should apply. The United States District Court of Minnesota faced
this problem in Burns v. Ersek.31 The complaint alleged underlying
predicate acts of securities fraud and mail fraud. Two competing
limitations periods existed, the three year period of the state's Blue
Sky Act3 2 and the six year general limitation period for fraud.33
The court found that the case was primarily a securities fraud case
because the plaintiff referred to mail fraud in only one sentence of
the thirty-seven page complaint,3 4 whereas securities fraud
predominated the complaint. Accordingly, the court applied the
three year statute of limitations from the Blue Sky Act, which
barred the plaintiff's claim.35
Other district courts have used the limitations period of the
state law offense most analogous to the dominant predicate act in
the RICO complaint. In Eisenberg v. Gagnon,3 6 the civil RICO count
had underpinnings in securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud.
The state's Blue Sky Act provided a three year limitations period
for securities fraud.3 7 The limitations period for common law
fraud, the analogous state cause of action for the mail and wire
fraud allegations, was six years.38 The court found that the allega-
tions of securities fraud in the complaint were insubstantial, and
that the RICO count was capable of being sustained solely on the
1608 (Smith Supp. 1985); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.82.010 to .901 (West Supp. 1985);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80 to .87 (West Supp. 1984-85).
31 591 F. Supp. 837 (D. Minn. 1984). The plaintiff, a shareholder in Med General, Inc.,
sued the officers and directors under four theories: violating § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act; committing state common law offenses of fraud, deceit, and negligence; violat-
ing the state Blue Sky Act; and violating RICO. Id. at 838-39.
32 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.23, subd. 7 (West Supp. 1986).
33 The court stated that the standard for choosing among several local periods is that
"which best effectuates the federal policy at issue." 591 F. Supp. at 843 (quoting Charney
v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1967)). The court, however, never discussed the
policies of RICO and how a limitations period can best effectuate them. 591 F. Supp. at
843-45.
34 Id. at 845.
35 Id.
36 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (E.D. Pa. 1983). This court viewed RICO as creating a new
legal wrong, which was most analogous to an action in tort. Id. at 1353-54 (citing Blakey,
supra note 5, at 290 n.151 (1982)). However, the court appeared to look at the predicate
acts of the allegation in determining a limitations period. 564 F. Supp. at 1353-54.
37 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-504 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
38 564 F. Supp. at 1353.
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allegations of wire fraud and mail fraud.a9 Thus, the court applied
a six year statute of limitations to the RICO claim. In deciding the
issue, the court looked to the policies of RICO and chose the
longer limitations period "[i]n light of Congress' intent to have the
RICO statute liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes. ' 40
Burns and Eisenberg illustrate the problem that multiple predi-
cate acts present for determining an analogous state statute from
which to obtain a limitations period. One court has stated that
looking for the dominant predicate act is "arbitrary and capri-
cious." 4 1 Given the large number of offenses encompassed by
RICO,42 a court will likely have to choose between at least two dif-
ferent limitations periods.
A more troublesome problem with the particularistic approach
is that it does not fulfill the purposes of a statute of limitations. A
limitations period should protect the reasonable expectations of the
litigants, provide convenience for the judicial system, and notify a
potential defendant of his exposure to liability.43 The particularis-
tic approach, however, is not convenient for the judicial system.
Because both the state statute most analogous to the underlying
predicate offense and the predicate offense which dominates differ
with each case, each court will have to determine anew which limita-
tions period to apply. This will result in a lack of uniformity, with
courts applying different periods to similar RICO complaints in the
same state.
Moreover, a statute of limitations should, with reasonable cer-
tainty, inform the defendant of how long he will be exposed to lia-
bility and notify the plaintiff of how long he has to bring his claim.
Because the court, under the particularistic approach, will deter-
mine the limitations period for the RICO claim at trial, neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant will know with certainty which state stat-
ute is the most analogous, or which predicate offense the court will
39 Id. at 1354.
40 Id. But see Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1984) (rejecting the argument
that it should choose the longer period to effectuate RICO policy). See notes 31-35 supra
and accompanying text.
41 Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 809 (D. Md. 1985). See notes 79-81 infra and
accompanying text.
42 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See note 4 supra.
43 One commentator has defined the purposes of statutes of limitations as institutional,
remedial, and promotional. Special Project, supra note 6, at 1014-18. The institutional pur-
poses are to protect litigant's reasonable expectations, provide judicial convenience, and
preserve the credibility of the judicial system by preventing the litigation of stale claims.
The remedial purpose is to notify a potential defendant of how long he will be exposed to
liability. Similarly, the promotional purpose is to notify a potential plaintiff of the length of
time he has to bring a claim, encouraging him to bring suit quickly, yet allowing sufficient
time to do so.
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decide dominates the complaint. Furthermore, since one RICO
claim can arise from predicate acts committed in numerous states, 44
the potential litigants may not even know which state to look to in
determining the limitations period.
In addition to not serving the functions of a statute of limita-
tions, the lack of uniformity among and within states using the par-
ticularistic approach does not serve the policies of RICO.45
Congress designed RICO to address a federal concern: the nation-
wide infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime.46 In
Morley v. Cohen,47 the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland discussed the inconsistency of the policies behind state
law offenses and RICO by stating that:
RICO does not provide a remedy for the mere commission of
the predicate acts ...... "Commission of two or more predicate
acts is but an element of a § 1962 violation; those acts do not
themselves constitute the § 1962 violation." Accordingly, there
is no commonality of purpose between RICO and the statutory
scheme encompassing the predicate acts. They are not
designed to punish the same offenses. 48
The federal concerns behind RICO do not coincide with the
concerns of a state congress in choosing a limitations period for a
state offense. 49 The legislature provided the civil remedy of RICO
to induce private citizens to help fight organized crime and to re-
44 See note 6 supra.
45 A statute of limitations chosen from the forum state should "add[ress] the same or
similar policy considerations as are addressed by the federal right being asserted." O'Hara
v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981). See also note 5
supra and accompanying text.
46 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
47 610 F. Supp. 798 (D. Md. 1985). In Morley, plaintiffs alleged a RICO claim with
underlying predicate offenses of securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. Both parties
urged the court to analogize on the basis of underlying predicate offenses. The plaintiffs
argued that this would result in the limitations period for common law fraud. The defend-
ants, however, argtied that this would result in the period for securities laws violations-the
"paramount underlying predicate act."
The court had three reasons for declining to analogize on the basis of the underlying
predicate offense. First, "RICO does not provide a remedy for the mere commission of the
predicate acts .... [T]here is no commonality of purpose between RICO and the statutory
scheme encompassing the predicate acts." Id. at 808. Second, the expiration of the periods
for the predicate acts have no effect on a criminal RICO claim, and the same should be true
of civil RICO claims. Id. at 809. Finally, the court thought that using the limitations peri-
ods of the predicate offenses would be confusing when different predicate acts, with differ-
ent state limitations periods, were alleged. Id. Given the large "laundry list" of RICO
offenses, this problem could occur frequently. Determining which predicate act was domi-
nant would be "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 809.
48 Id. at 808 (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984)).
49 "State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in
mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will
not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies." Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
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dress racketeering injury,50 whereas states are concerned with spe-
cific crimes. Accordingly, states have applied periods as short as
two years. 5' The remedial purpose of RICO, however, suggests a
longer time to bring a claim, particularly given the complexity of a
RICO offense. 52 Therefore, the lack of clarity among and within
states using the particularistic approach does not serve the func-
tions of a statute of limitations and conflicts with the policies be-
hind RICO.
B. The Separate Act Approach
Some courts have characterized RICO as a claim in itself rather
than reducing the claim to its predicate acts. In determining the
limitations period for a civil RICO claim under this approach, these
courts have analogized to statutes with similar remedies,5 3 state
RICO statutes, 54 and assorted catch-all statutes. 55
1. State RICO Statutes
A state racketeering statute appears to be the most analogous
state cause of action to a federal civil RICO claim. Twenty-three
states have statutes similar to RICO.5 6 For example, the court in
Delta Coal Program v. Libman57 indicated that the five year statute of
limitations for Georgia's state RICO statute would apply to a fed-
eral civil RICO action brought in Georgia. Another court, how-
50 See note 5 supra and accompanying text. See also Morley, 610 F. Supp. at 652.
51 See Clute v. Davenport Co., 584 F. Supp. 1562, 1577 (D. Conn. 1984) (applied two
year period for actions under the state's Blue Sky Act).
52 See note 4 supra. The investigation may require establishing the "pattern" of racket-
eering activity. "[E]ven when one has a suspicion that one or more predicate acts may exist,
an investigation which covers the ten-year statutory period is likely to be very time consum-
ing." Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Del.
1984) (rejecting a six month period; adopting a three year period). But see 610 F. Supp. at
652-53 (two year period is not so short as to conflict with RICO's remedial policies).
53 610 F. Supp. at 648.
54 Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 554 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
55 Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 249 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985) (three year period for actions to enforce a liability created by
statute); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) (three year period for actions
based on statute); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 809 (D. Md. 1985) (three year period
for civil actions at law); Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp.
724, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (three year period for action to recover upon a liability, penalty,
or forfeiture created by statute); Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, 579 F.
Supp. 1284, 1290 (D. Del. 1984) (three year period for action based on a statute); Victoria
Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429, 432 (D. Colo. 1984) (three year period for
residuary claims); Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F. Supp. 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 1983)
(three year period for liability created by statute); Ingram Corp. v.J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
495 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 n.4 (E.D. La. 1980) (one year period for damages resulting for
offenses).
56 See note 30 supra.
57 554 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
[Vol. 61:495
ever, refused to apply the limitations period of the state RICO
statute to a federal civil RICO claim.58 The court reasoned that the
analogy was inappropriate because the state statute did not provide
a private cause of action for money damages, and because a court
should not apply a criminal statute of limitations to a civil action.59
The state RICO statute would be the ideal analogy if all states
had such a statute. Not all states, however, have state RICO stat-
utes, and not all of the existing state RICO statutes have an express
statute of limitations. 60 Furthermore, courts may refuse to analo-
gize to the state RICO statute because of differences between the
state RICO statute and federal RICO.61
2. Statutes With Similar Remedies
In fashioning a statute of limitations, courts have analogized
civil RICO to other statutes with treble damage provisions. In Elec-
tronic Relays (India) Pvt., Ltd. v. Pascente,62 the plaintiff alleged predi-
cate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud.63 In determining the statute
of limitations for the civil RICO claim, the court borrowed a four-
step analysis from a recent Supreme Court case which determined
the limitations period for the Civil Rights Act.64 In the analysis, the
court must first determine whether one limitations period should
apply to all RICO cases or whether the period should vary with the
particular facts of the case. 65 Second, the court must analogize the
RICO case before it to a state cause of action. 66 Third, the court
needs to determine what limitations period applies to that state
cause of action.67 Finally, the court should determine whether the
period coincides with the policies of RICO, and if not, what limita-
tions period better serves those policies. 68 This multi-step analysis
is effective because it addresses the issue of whether RICO should
be characterized as a separate statute in itself or as a group of pred-
icate acts. The analysis also contemplates the policies of RICO and
58 D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 232 (M.D. Pa. 1982). The court chose the six
year period for common law fraud instead. The alleged predicate acts were mail fraud and
wire fraud. Id.
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41 6.2 (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1
to -6 (Michie Supp. 1985); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.04 (Page 1982).
61 See D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 232 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (court refused to
analogize federal civil RICO to state criminal racketeering statute).
62 610 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
63 Id. at 649.
64 Id. at 649-50 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985)). See also notes 91-95
infra and accompanying text.
65 610 F. Supp. at 649.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 649-50.
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searches for a limitations period that will be consistent with these
policies. Ideally, however, the fourth step should also stress that
the chosen limitations period should fulfill the policy functions of a
statute of limitations.
In applying the four-step analysis, the court in Electronic Relays
decided that one limitations period should apply to all RICO ac-
tions brought in Illinois to reduce "uncertainty, and unproductive
and ever increasing litigation." 69 Addressing the second and third
questions, the court characterized RICO as an action for treble
damages, "civil RICO's most distinctive feature." 7o Accordingly,
the court chose the two year statute of limitations for personal in-
jury actions, which had been applied to other actions for treble
damages within the state.71 The court decided that two years was
69 Id. at 650 (quoting Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1947).
70 610 F. Supp. at 651-52. The court reasoned that states already provide remedies for
most predicate acts which can form the basis of a RICO claim. Only the remedy is different
from that provided by the state. Id. at 651. See also notes 28-29 supra and accompanying
text. However, although treble damages are a distinctive feature, RICO is not merely a new
remedy for old wrongs. See Durante Bros. & Sons v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 248
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 808 (D.
Md. 1985) ("RICO does not provide a remedy for the mere commission of the predicate
acts.").
The court rejected the five year period that applies to criminal RICO. Id. at 65 1. The
court stated that the policies behind criminal RICO and civil RICO are different. Further-
more, a court should adopt a federal statute only when the analogous state statute would
conflict with the policy behind the federal statute. Id. at 651-52. See also D'Iorio v.
Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 232 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (criminal statute of limitations for state
RICO statute inappropriate for private action). But see Note, Civil RICO: Searching for the
Appropriate Statute of Limitations in Actions Under Section 1964(c), 14 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 765, 793-
94 (1985) (urging a uniform approach and suggesting the five year limitation period for
criminal RICO).
The court in Electronic Relays also rejected limitations periods for tortious interference
with economic relations and for actions to recover damages for an injury to property. 610
F. Supp. at 652. The court was so enamored with the treble damages remedy that it re-
jected any other characterization: "[Any] characterization [that] ignores the treble damages
feature of RICO ... fails to capture the essence of a RICO claim." Id. The court contin-
ued, "RICO is much more than a remedy for injured persons-it provides considerable
incentive for private citizens to act as private attorneys general and a very large and very
tangible deterrent for those who might be thinking of violating its provisions." Id.
71 Id. Although Illinois courts have determined that treble damages are penal in na-
ture, the plaintiff in Electronic Relays objected, arguing that civil RICO was remedial, not
penal, in nature. Id. The court resolved the conflict by reasoning that RICO had remedial
and punitive aspects, but in any case the court was restricted by Illinois case law which
regarded treble damages as punitive. Id. at 652-53. The court avoided the objection by
stating that "the question here is not whether the state's reasons for choosing two years are
consistent with Congress' intent; it is whether the two year period itself is consistent with
that intent." Id. at 653 (emphasis in original). The court found that two years was not so
short a period as to conflict with the remedial purpose of RICO. Id. But see D'Iorio v.
Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 232 (M.D. Pa. 1982) ("Despite the treble damage feature, we
do not believe that [RICO] can properly be classified as an action for a civil penalty or
forfeiture."); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 685
(N.D. Ind. 1982) (RICO is not penal in nature; therefore, the two year statute of limitations
for statutory penalties was inappropriate).
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sufficiently long to be consistent with the policies of RICO. 7 2
Characterization of a federal statute is a matter of federal, not
state, law.73 A federal characterization means that, in all states,
courts will consider RICO a certain type of crime for limitations
period purposes. According to Electronic Relays, states should con-
sider RICO as an action for treble damages and apply whatever
state limitations period applies to actions for treble damages. A
federal characterization of RICO helps eliminate some confusion.
Unlike a particularistic approach, a federal characterization pro-
vides uniformity, as the same limitations period will govern all civil
RICO actions brought within each state. A uniform period within
the state notifies the potential litigants of the basis of the analogy
each state will use in determining a limitations period.74 The prob-
lem with this approach, however, is that one RICO claim can be
potentially litigated in more than one state.75 This can leave the
litigants uncertain as to which state's law will determine the statute
of limitations, and which state statute the court will determine gov-
erns the federal characterization of the claim. Such problems con-
flict with RICO's status as a nationwide weapon against organized
crime.76
3. Catch-All Statutes
Several courts have arrived at state catch-all limitations periods
for civil RICO claims either through analogy or by process of elimi-
nation. 77 Some courts have arrived at the catch-all statute by re-
72 610 F. Supp. at 653. "A violation of RICO involves a very serious injury, a kind of
injury that cannot go unnoticed by the victim .... Two years is certainly long enough.., to
bring suit." Id.
73 Id. at 650. See also Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (1985).
74 This approach works well for claims brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). The Supreme Court uniformly characterized all § 1983
claims as claims for personal injuries for statute of limitations purposes. Id. at 1947. See
also notes 91-95 infra and accompanying text.
75 See note 6 supra.
76 See note 5 supra.
77 See Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 249 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985) (accepted three year statute of limitations governing
actions to enforce a liability created by statute); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th
Cir. 1984) (accepted three year statute of limitations governing actions based on statute);
Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 789, 809 (D. Md. 1985) (accepted three year statute of
limitations governing civil actions at law); Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326,
579 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (D. Del. 1984) (accepted three year statute of limitations gov-
erning actions based upon a statute); Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429,
432 (D. Colo. 1984) (accepted three year statute of limitations governing residuary claims);
Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(accepted three year statute of limitations governing actions to recover upon a liability,
penalty, or forfeiture created or imposed by statute); Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F.
Supp. 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (accepted three year statute of limitations governing liabil-
ities created by statute).
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jecting the approach of analogizing to the underlying predicate
offense. 78 For example, in Morley v. Cohen,7 9 the court adopted the
state's catch-all period which provided that "[a] civil action at law
shall be filed within three years from the date it first accrues." 8 0
The court gave three reasons for choosing this statute: (1) it di-
rectly applies to civil actions at law, clearly encompassing civil
RICO claims; (2) three years seemed not too long and not too
short; and (3) the appeal of having one limitations period apply to
all civil RICO claims brought in the state.81
This approach, like the uniform federal characterization
adopted by Electronics Relays, has an advantage over the particularis-
tic approach. Providing uniformity within a state serves the notice
functions of a statute of limitations. 82 The same problems exist,
however, when a RICO claim arises from actions occurring in sev-
eral different states. 83 When different states adopt different limita-
tions periods for RICO offenses,8 4 neither the defendant nor the
plaintiff will know exactly the length of time in which the plaintiff
can bring the claim. In addition, deciding which state law applies
requires time, expense, and litigation. Finally, this approach, like
the uniform federal characterization approach, encourages forum
shopping as litigants might search for the state with the statute of
limitations that best serves their interests.
78 See Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 248-49 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985) (RICO is concerned with far more than the under-
lying predicate acts; "there is no state analog to the present civil RICO claim"); Morley v.
Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 789, 809 (D. Md. 1985) ("Viability of a civil RICO claim should not be
premised on the timeliness of the predicate acts."); Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-
Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D.N.Y 1984) (analogizing to the predicate acts
would oversimplify the elements of a RICO claim).
79 610 F. Supp. 789, 798 (D. Md. 1985).
80 MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (Michie 1984).
81 610 F. Supp. at 798. See also Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755
F.2d 239, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985) (chose period governing actions
to enforce a liability created by statute because "[tihere is no state law analog to ... civil
RICO claim[s]"); Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (adopted period for action to recover upon a liability, penalty, or forfeiture
created by statute; rejected approach of analogizing on the basis of predicate acts, which
"would oversimplify the elements of a RICO claim"); Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp.,
587 F. Supp. 429, 431-32 (D. Colo. 1984) (adopted period for residuary claims; could not
find any state analog to RICO).
82 Within any given state, potential civil RICO litigants will know what limitations pe-
riod courts will apply to an action brought in that state, regardless of the predicate acts
involved.
83 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
84 The difference in length of periods can be substantial. Compare Ingram Corp. v. J.
Ray McDermotte Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. La. 1980) (one year) with Delta Coal Pro-
gram v. Libman, 554 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (five years).
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II. Suggested Solution: A Uniform Federal Approach
RICO needs a limitations period that serves the purposes of a
statute of limitations and is consistent with the remedial, federal
policies of RICO.85 Given the structure of RICO,86 its purpose of
being a nationwide weapon against organized crime,87 and the
many possible forums for a RICO complaint,88 RICO should have a
uniform, federal limitations period.
To achieve a uniform, federal limitations period for RICO, two
choices exist. Congress could amend RICO and specify a limita-
tions period. Both the Senate8 9 and the House of Representa-
tives,90 however, had opportunities to provide civil RICO with an
express limitations period, but none passed. Until Congress de-
cides to amend RICO to include an express limitations period, the
judicial system needs to fashion a uniform approach that is consis-
tent with the federal nature of RICO and fulfills the functions of a
limitations period. Courts can achieve clarity and uniformity by
adopting the limitations period of the most analogous federal
statute.
The Supreme Court recently recognized the need for uniform
characterization of section 1983 claims in Wilson v. Garcia.91 The
Court found that choosing a statuteof limitations based on the par-
ticular facts of a section 1983 claim bred uncertainty and time-con-
suming litigation, and too many analogies existed.92 Their
reasoning, when applied to civil RICO actions, argues for a uniform
federal limitations period. Wilson stated that the characterization of
a section 1983 claim for the purpose of determining the statute of
limitations is a matter of federal law. The Court stated that section
1983 claims should be characterized as a personal injury cause of
action and that states are to use that characterization for statute of
limitations purposes.93 With this approach, the limitations period
85 See note 5 supra.
86 See note 4 supra.
87 See note 5 supra.
88 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
89 See 118 CONG. REC. 37,264 (1972) (Sen. McClellan's and Hruska's proposed amend-
ment contained a statute of limitations, but the amendment never reached the House.).
90 See 116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (1970) (proposed floor amendment of Rep. Steiger); 116
CONG. REC. 31,914 (1970) (Rep. Poff proposed a five year limitations period for civil
RICO).
91 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). See generally Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Stat-
ute of Limitations for Section 1983 Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 440 (1986).
92 105 S. Ct. at 1945-47. The Court thought these difficulties interfered with § 1983's
remedial purpose. Id.
93 105 S. Ct. at 1942-47. Although the Court recognized the general rule of adoption
of the state statute, it reiterated the principle that a state statute should not be used when
borrowing the state statute would frustrate the federal policies behind the federal statute.
A number of Supreme Court cases borrow a federal limitations period in preference to the
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for each section 1983 claim will be clear.94
To obtain equal clarity for RICO actions, courts should apply a
uniform, federal limitations period. Most section 1983 claims are
based on single confrontations. 95 RICO, on the other hand, re-
quires at least two acts,96 acts which could occur in different states
applying different limitations periods. Because the same reasoning
behind creating one clear limitations period for each section 1983
claim applies equally to RICO claims, courts should establish one
clear limitations period for each RICO claim.
By adopting the most analogous federal statute, a single uni-
form period will apply to all civil RICO actions. This would allevi-
ate confusion, minimize litigation over the appropriate limitations
period, and provide notice of a definite length of time to potential
litigants. The clearest federal analogy to RICO is the federal anti-
trust laws. 97 The same goal, to remedy competitive injuries to busi-
ness, underlies both RICO and the antitrust laws. In addition, the
antitrust laws provided a model for RICO and predecessors to
RICO closely followed the Sherman Act.98 One predecessor even
state statute. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1982) (state
statute too short to protect the interests of the plaintiff); Occidental Insurance v. EEOC,
432 U.S. 355 (1977) (applying state limitations period unduly hinders the policy of the Civil
Rights Act by placing too great a burden on the administrative agency); McAllister v. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (more practical to use federal limitations period
for seaworthiness actions); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (principles of fed-
eral equity causes of action are hostile to the "mechanical rules of statutes of limitations").
94 The Court recognized that when the basis for analogy is the facts of a particular
action, two or more state causes of action would likely be analogous, each with a different
limitations period. Thus, different periods might apply to the same claim and different
claims in the same state could end up with different periods. 105 S. Ct. at 1946. The Court
reasoned that Congress never intended such confusion and would prefer the uniform char-
acterization. Id. at 1946-47.
95 See, e.g., Wilson 105 S. Ct. 1938 (state trooper assaulted the plaintiff); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961) (thirteen Chicago police officers ransacked plaintiff's home); Gilmere
v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11 th Cir. 1985) (police shot and killed plaintiffs brother);
Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1985) (village manager wrote a letter repri-
manding plaintiff, the acting police chief). See generally Eckhart, Jr. & Eckhart, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983: A Primer for the Civil Rights Lawyer, 20 IDAHo L. REV. 585 (1984); Daniell &
Mooresmith, Section 1983 Actions: A Practical Overview for the General Practitioner, 45 ALA. LAW.
34 (1984).
96 See note 4 supra.
97 The antitrust laws were a strong influence on RICO. Senator McClellan, one of the
Senators to introduce S. 1861, said "[b]ecause the [antitrust] remedies have been effective
in removing and preventing harmful behavior in the business segment of our economy,
they show great promise as tools for attacking organized crime.... The many references to
antitrust cases are necessary because the particular equitable remedies desired have been
brought to their greatest development in this field." 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969). See also
Blakey, supra note 5, at 262-90 (discussion of the legislative history of S. 1861 and refer-
ences to the antitrust laws); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980).
98 One predecessor to RICO, S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), proposed an
amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act which would prohibit the investment or use in
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provided a four year limitations period, 99 the same period provided
by the Clayton Act.100 The reasoning of Electronic Relays10 1 which
characterizes RICO as an action for treble damages, supports this
analogy. Borrowing the limitations period from the Clayton Act
would give civil RICO a uniform limitations period of four years.10 2
III. Conclusion
Civil RICO does not contain an express statute of limitations.
In fashioning a statute of limitations for a federal statute which
does not contain a limitations period, courts have generally applied
the limitations period of the most analogous state statute. No con-
sensus exists as to how courts should characterize RICO to draw
the analogy. Courts have characterized a RICO claim in terms of its
underlying predicate acts, in terms of its remedy, and in terms of its
statutory origin. This results in a wide variety of possible limita-
tions periods among and within states. This confusion serves
business of unreported income. As the bill's sponsor, Senator Hruska, stated, "The anti-
trust laws now provide a well-established vehicle for attacking anticompetitive behavior of
all kinds. They contain broad discovery provisions as well as civil and criminal sanctions.
These extraordinarily broad and flexible remedies ought to be used more extensively
against the "legitimate" business activities of brganized crime." 113 CONG. REC. 1799
(1967).
Another predecessor, S. 2049, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967), paralleled the Sherman
Act. See Mann, Legislative History of RICO, in 1 TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME 58, 73-80 (G. R. Blakey ed. 1980) (description of the
legislative history of RICO and its relationship to the antitrust laws).
The Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association analyzed both of these bills and
agreed that "organized crime must be stopped . . . [and] antitrust machinery possesses
certain advantages worthy of utilization in this fight." Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.
30 Before the Subcomm. No. 5, House Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1970).
The Antitrust Section, however, recommended enacting separate legislation to prevent un-
favorable impact on the antitrust laws and burdening the new legislation with a body of
precedent. Id. Now "RICO provides criminal law the prosecutorial and civil tools of anti-
trust without limiting case law." Mann, Legislative History of RICO, supra, at 70.
99 S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
100 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).
101 610 F. Supp. 648, 649-53 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See notes 62-72 supra and accompanying
text.
102 Prior to 1955, no federal statute of limitations existed for private antitrust actions
and federal courts borrowed state rules. In 1955, the Clayton Act was amended to provide
for a four year statute of limitations for both private and government damage actions. 15
U.S.C. § 15b (1982). Section 5(i) of the Clayton Act provides that where there is a pending
civil or criminal proceeding instituted by the government to enforce the "antitrust laws,"
any private action based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in the proceeding
will not be barred until a year after the conclusion of the government's case. 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(b) (1982). If courts borrow the four year limitations period of the antitrust laws, they
should also borrow this provision. A government action may notify potential plaintiffs of
injuries they had not yet known of, and this provision would give them time to bring a civil
action, even if four years had passed from the time of the offense. The government must
bring criminal RICO proceedings within five years. United States v. Bethea, 672 F.2d 407,
419 (5th Cir. 1982).
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neither the purposes of a statute of limitations nor the policies of
RICO.
The same considerations which prompted the Supreme Court
to establish a uniform characterization for section 1983 claims man-
date a uniform limitations period for civil RICO. Ideally, Congress
should amend RICO and provide an express limitations period.
Until then, Courts should adopt the limitations period of the near-
est analogous federal statute, the four year period for the federal
antitrust laws.
Elizabeth D. De Armond
